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LEGISLATION
ARTICLE IX

OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
THE "FLOATING" LIEN

CODE:

Through the combined effect of several sections of Article IX
of the Uniform Commercial Code, a secured party, by means
of a single security agreement, will be able to create a lien that
will hover over the personal property of a debtor. If the security
agreement contains an after-acquired property clause, the creditor's
lien will attach ' to the property acquired by the debtor after the
agreement has been made. This lien, known as a "floating" lien,
may then be perfected 2 by the creditor when he files a "financing
statement" in accordance with the pertinent provisions 3 of article
nine. Upon perfection of the floating lien, the creditor will have
secured his interest from all subsequent creditors except those
who hold purchase money security interests which conform to the
statutory requirements, 4 those who hold property purchased from
the debtor in the ordinary course of the debtor's business, 5 and
those who have purchased consumer goods for personal, family
or household purposes. 6
Although the concept of a lien that can attach to a debtor's
after-acquired property is not a new one, the Code's method of
creating and securing a floating lien does make changes in the
existing law. In addition to examining the Code and some of
these changes this note will discuss two problems which the secured
party can expect to encounter.
Creation and Perfection of the Floating Lien
The article nine approach to the creation of a floating lien

is an uncomplicated one.

Through a "security agreement,"

7

a

1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204(1),(3).
2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-302.
3 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-402, 9-403.
4 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-312(3),(4).
5 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-307(1).

6 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-307(2).
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-105(h).
A security agreement is one
which creates and provides for a security interest.
7
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"secured party" 8 is able to combine such pre-Code security devices
as chattel mortgages, trust receipts, and assignments of accounts
receivable into a single instrument. 9 This may be contrasted with
current New York law which, rather than eliminating distinctions
between the various security instruments, tends to emphasize them. 10
Thus, in order to understand the effect of an after-acquired
property clause in New York today, one would be required to know
the appropriate provisions of the Factor's Lien Act," the Uniform
13
Trust Receipts Law 12 and the law relating to chattel mortgages,'
depending upon the type of instrument in which the clause is to
be incorporated.
Section 9-204
In accordance with its more general approach, section 9-204(3)
of the Code provides that a creditor may secure his loan by
creating a lien over property to be acquired by the debtor in the
future. Subdivision 1 of this section provides that this interest
or lien will attach to the after-acquired property when three
conditions are met. First, the agreement must state that the security
interest will attach; second, an advance must have been made
by the creditor; and third, the debtor must have acquired an
interest in the property. 14 Since the creditor's interest will attach
automatically when the debtor acquires his interest in the property,
it will be unnecessary for the former to prepare supplemental
agreements to cover the new collateral as it is received by the
debtor.15
In addition to permitting a security agreement to contain an
after-acquired property clause, section 9-204 states that the agreement may provide for future advances to be made by the creditor. 16
8 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-105(i).
A secured party is one "in
whose favor there is a security interest ......
9 See Coogan & Bok, The Impact of Article 9 of the Uniform Coin-

inercial Code on the Corporate Indenture, 69 YALE L.J. 203, 206 (1959);

ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, NEW YORK ANNOTATIONS TO
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND REPORT To LEGISLATURE OF NEW YORK
STATE 247 (1961).
COMMISSION

10 See Utica Trust & Deposit Co. v. Decker, 244 N.Y. 340, 155 N.E. 665
(1927), wherein the court discusses the differences between a chattel
mortgage and a factor's lien on merchandise.
"N.Y. PERS. PRop. LAW § 45.
12 N.Y. PFIs. PROP. LAw §§ 50-58-m.
13 N.Y. LIEN LAW §§ 230-299-1.
'14UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
5
' UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 9-204(1).

§9-204, comment 2. See Summers, Should
Oregon Adopt the Uniform Commercial Code Concept of the "Floating
41 ORE. L. REv. 182, 185 (1962).
Lien!'?
6
1

UNIFORB.

COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 9-204(5).
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Any future advances, therefore, will also be secured by the subsequently acquired property.
At this point it is appropriate to examine the Code's conception
of "attachment" of a security interest. While a creditor's interest
may attach to after-acquired property, this does not necessarily
mean that the creditor's interest will be superior to the claims
of other creditors. This will depend upon whether or not he
Alhas taken the steps necessary to "perfect" his interest.17
though perfection of the floating lien will be discussed at another
point, for present purposes, it should be noted that perfection is
generally achieved by filing.'
As already indicated, the concept that a lien may attach to
after acquired property is not a new one. Thus. New York has
given effect to after-acquired property clauses between the parties
to the agreement in chattel mortgages, 19 in factor's lien agree21
ments, 20 in assignments of accounts receivable and contract rights,
and in trust receipts transactions. 22 Furthermore, the creditor's
interest attached whenever the debtor's rights in the property came
into existence. 23 . It must be pointed out, however, that although
these agreements have been enforced between the immediate parties,
2 -4
they have not always survived the claims of subsequent creditors.
The reasons for not enforcing them against third parties will be developed at another point.
Section 9-205
Section 9-205 is also illustrative
lien can be created and maintained by
difficulty. This section permits the
control over the collateral once the
Thus, a security agreement will not
17 See

UNIFORM

of the fact that a floating
the secured party with little
debtor to exercise complete
agreement has been made.
be invalidated even when a

§ 9-312(5) (a),(b).
§ 9-302.

CO-MERCIAL CODE

Is UNIFORM COM.MERCIAL CODE

19 Zartman v. First Nat'l Bank, 189 N.Y. 267, 82 N.E. 127 (1907)
Kribbs v. Alford, 120 N.Y. 519, 24 N.E. 811 (1890); McCaffrey v. Woodin,
65 N.Y. 459 (1875).
20 N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 45; see Heynian v. Kevorkian, 193 App. Div.
859, 184 N.Y. Supp. 783 (1st Dep't 1920).
21 N.Y. PFRs. PROP. LAW § 45; City of New York v. Bedford Bar &
Grill, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 429, 141 N.E.2d 575, 161 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1957).
22 See N.Y. PEaS. PROP. LAW § 54 which states that a contract to iive a
trust receipt is equivalent to a trust receipt.

23 Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey, 142 N.Y. 570, 37 N.E. 632 (1894):
McCaffrey v. Woodin, supra note 19.
24 City of New York v. Bedford Bar & Grill, Inc., supra note 21; Matter
of Gruner, 295 N.Y. 510, 68 N.E.2d 514 (1946) ; Zartnian v. First Nat'l
Bank, supra note 1); Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey. supra note 23,
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debtor is able "to use, commingle or dispose" of collateral without
having to account to the secured party for so doing.25
By allowing the debtor to exercise dominion over the collateral,
section 9-205 effectively disposes of the Benedict v. Ratner20
doctrine. In that case, the United States Supreme Court interpreted New York law in order to determine whether an assignment of accounts receivable was enforceable against a trustee in
bankruptcy. The Court found that the assignment was fraudulent
in law and inoperative against the trustee because the assigneeto treat the -collateral as his
creditor enabled the assignor-debtor
27
own, without limitation.
It has been asserted however, that the Benedict v. Rather
doctrine has already been weakened in at least two areas, by
New York's existing law.28 Thus, in a chattel mortgage transaction where the collateral consists of agricultural produce, the
mortgagor may sell any part of the produce if the proceeds are
either applied to the debt or are invested in the remaining collateral.29 Similarly, when an agreement imposes a lien on accounts
receivable or other proceeds that will result from the sale of
merchandise by the debtor, and some merchandise has been returned to the debtor by a dissatisfied purchaser, the debtor may
treat this returned property as his own. In such a case, there
will be no adverse effects on the lien that is covering any other
accounts owed to the debtor.30
Although section 9-205 permits the debtor to maintain unlimited control over the collateral, 31 one may question the advisability, from the creditor's standpoint, of utilizing this section
to its fullest extent. The creditor may find that some degree
of control over the debtor is necessary in order to avoid a possible

25

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-205.
26268 U.S. 353 (1925); see UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 9-205, comment

1.

27The New York rule is similar with respect to chattel mortgages,
Skilton v. Codington, 185 N.Y. 80 (1906); and with respect to trust receipt
financing, McCloskey v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 7 Misc. 2d 501,
16S N.Y.S.2d 522 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
28 Co0.,IISSION
UNIFORM

ON

COMMERCIAL

UNIFORM

STATE LAWS,

CODE AND

REPORT

NEW YORK ANNOTATIONS TO
TO LEGISLATURE OF NEW YORK

STATE 264 (1961).
29 N.Y. LIEN LAW § 230-b (2).
30 N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 45 (see fourth paragraph); see Block v.
Mill Factors Corp., 134 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1943).

31 Section 9-205 makes it clear, however, that when perfection of a

security interest depends upon possession of the collateral by the creditor

rather than upon filing, the debtor must not be permitted to have access to the
goods. Thus, when the security transaction takes the form of a pledge, the
debtor may not exercise any control over the property.
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loss of collateral and to avoid the preference
32 problem that is
created by Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act.
Section 9-302
The secured party, as stated previously, should in most instances file a financing statement in order to perfect his security
interest. 33
Whether such statement must be filed appears to
depend more upon the nature of the collateral than upon the type
of instrument that is used. For example, the creditor need not
file if a purchase money interest in farm equipment having a
value of less than 2500 dollars, 34 or in consumer

goods 35 is

involved.
The financing statement that is filed need contain only the
signatures and addresses of the debtor and the secured party
and a statement indicating the type of property that is covered by
the lien. 36 In addition, an initial filing of the financing state37
ment will preserve the effectiveness of the lien for five years,
unless the agreement provides for a shorter period.
Although New York's present filing requirements depend upon
the instrument that is used rather than upon the nature of the
collateral, section 9-302 will not change the present law significantly.
Today, in most cases, filing is necessary to protect chattel
mortgages, 38 trust receipts 39 and factor's liens.4 0 Moreover, the
filing of a statement instead of the42instrument itself is sufficient
for trust receipts 41 and factor's liens.
Section 9-312
This section contains the general rules for determining priorities
between persons who have conflicting interests in the same property.
It provides:
(1)

When both of the security instruments in the collateral
are perfected by filing, the order of filing will determine
priority whether or not the interest of the party who
filed first attached before or after filing. 43

3230

Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 64 Stat. 25 (1950), 11 U.S.C. §96

(1958).
33
34
35
36

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
37
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
38 N.Y. LIEN LAW § 230.
39 N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW
40 N.Y. PERS. PROP.LAw
41 N.Y. PFRs. PROP. LAW
42 N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW
43
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

CODE § 9-302.
CODE § 9-302(c).
CODE § 9-302(d).
CODE § 9-402(1).
CODE § 9-403(2).

§ 58.
§ 45.
§ 58-e.
§ 45.
CODF § 9-312(5)

(a).
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If only one of the two conflicting interests is perfected
by filing or if both are perfected by other than filing, the
Thus, where an
order of perfection will control. 4
interest is perfected by a creditor by reason of his
having taken possession of the collateral,45 he will have
priority over another creditor whose agreement was
executed earlier, but whose agreement was not filed
earlier.
Finally, when neither of the conflicting interests has been
perfected, the order of attachment is the determining
factor. 46 -Attachment, it will be remefibered, depends
on the existence of an agreement that the interest attach,
value having been given by the
4 7 creditor and the debtor
having rights in the collateral.

A significant exception to these three rules is found in the
preference given by the Code to purchase money security interests.
These interests are created when a security interest is "retained
by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price;
or taken by a person who by making advances . . . gives value
to enable the debtor to acquire rights in . . . [the] collateral .... ,, 48

When a purchase money interest is given by a debtor for the
purchase of inventory, the purchase money creditor's lien will be
protected from both prior as well as subsequent floating lien
creditors if he has satisfied two conditions. He must give special
notice to those prior creditors who he knows will have conflicting
interests in the inventory, and must perfect his interest at the time
the debtor takes possession of the inventory. 49 With respect to
purchase money interests in collateral other than inventory, the
purchase money creditor will have priority without giving special
notice if his interest is
perfected within ten days after the debtor
50
receives the collateral.
The comments of the Code indicate that the existing law has
"under one or another theory, usually contrived to protect purchase
44

UNIFORIM Co MERCIAL CODE §

45
UNIFORM
4
6 UNIFORM
47

COMMERCIAL
COMMERCIAL
UNLFORM COMMERCIAL
48 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

49

9-312(5) (b).

CODE § 9-302(i).
CODE § 9-312(5) (c).
CODE § 9-204(1).
CODE § 9-107.

§ 9-312(3).
§ 9-312(4). The reason for this distinction
between inventory and non-inventory type collateral is that in the ordinary
50

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE

inventory type collateral transaction, the purchase money creditor makes
periodic advances as new inventory is received by the debtor. If the debtor
is fraudulent and is about to receive advances from a second inventory
financier, the notice provision would require the second financier to give
notice to the first. Therefore, the first financier could discontinue his advances without loss. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-312, comment 3.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

398

[VoL. 37

." 51
money interests over after-acquired property interests ....
Thus, in New York, a conditional seller who has not filed is given
preference over a prior mortgagee claiming under an after-acquired
property clause.52 In these instances, the courts reason that the
mortgagee's interest must fail when it conflicts with that of a
conditional seller because the latter interest arises directly from
the transaction.5 3 This thinking is closely analogous to the
reasoning used by New York courts when the claim of a chattel
mortgagee is challenged by a judgment creditor 54 or by a trustee
in bankruptcy. 55 In such cases, it is thought that because property
secured by the rortgage is not yet in being, an equitable lien is
created between the mortgagor and mortgagee. Consequently, the
mortgage lien is not enforceable against either the judgment creditor
or the trustee.
Article nine will not affect the result of those cases which
have sustained the interests of conditional sellers because of the
preference given to purchase money interests. It will, however,
destroy their rationale. The Code provides:
A security interest arising by virtue of an after-acquired property clause has
equal status with a security interest in collateral in which the debtor has
rights at the time value is given under the security agreement. . . . That
is to say: the security interest in after-acquired property is not merely
an "equitable" interest; no further action by the secured party-such as the
56
taking of a supplemental agreement covering the new collateral-is required.
On the basis of this statement it may also be assumed that the
judgment creditor will no longer have priority over the previously
perfected floating lien.
In spite of the relative ease with which the floating lien may
be created and perfected under the Code, there are some problems
For example, it is
which the secured party cannot overlook.
anticipated that particular difficulty will be caused by Section
60 of the Bankruptcy Act 57 and by the federal tax lien as it
exists under Section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

:'I UNIFORM COMNIFxaRCIAL CODE §9-312, comment 3.
52 Washington Trust Co. v. Morse Iron Works & Dry Dock Co.,

106
App. Div. 195, 94 N.Y. Supp. 495 (2d Dep't 1905), modified, 187 N.Y.
307 (1907) ; see New York & Suburban Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Crescent
Constr. Corp., 196 Misc. 532, 92 N.Y.S.2d 533 (Sup. Ct. 1949).

51 Ibid.

(1894).
Zartman v. First Nat'l Bank, 189 N.Y. 267, 82 N.E. 127 (1907).
z UNIFORM COMMERCIA. CODE § 9-204, comment 2.
as amended, 64 Stat. 25 (1950), 11 U.S.C.
5 30 Stat. 562 (1898),
§ 96 (1958).
51 Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey, 142 N.Y. 570, 37 N.E. 632
55
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Section 9-108 and the Preference Problem

Section 60(b) of the Bankruptcy Act provides that the trustee
in bankruptcy may set aside any preference that has been received
by a creditor from a debtor if the creditor knew or had reasonable
cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent at the time the
preference was made.58 A preference, as defined by section 60(a), 59
is a transfer of any property by an insolvent debtor to a creditor
for an antecedent debt if the transfer was made within four
months before the filing, by the debtor or against the debtor,
of a petition in bankruptcy.
The conflict that may arise between a secured party under a
floating lien agreement and a trustee in bankruptcy is illustrated
by the following example. Under the terms of a security agreement betveen X and Y, X receives a lien over Y's after-acquired
property in consideration of several advances already made to Y.
Then, within four months of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy,
Y obtains new property. X, knowing that Y is insolvent, takes
possession of the new "collateral" and is challenged by the trustee
in bankruptcy under section 60. On these facts, the trustee will
be successful in his action as the transfer was made for an
antecedent debt, within four months of the filing of the petition,
and with knowledge by the creditor of the debtor's insolvency.
It is in this situation, however, that section 9-108 of the Code
becomes applicable. It provides that the property transferred
to the creditor in the above example is deemed to have been
taken by the creditor for "new value" if the debtor had acquired
his rights in the property in the ordinary course of his business
or under a contract of purchase made according to the security
agreement. By deeming an "antecedent debt" to be "new value,"
section 9-108 would appear to protect the floating lien creditor from
the trustee in bankruptcy. 0° It is also apparent that section 9-108
was enacted on the assumption that "the determination of when
transfer is for antecedent debt is largely left by the Bankruptcy
Act to state law." 61
5s 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 64 Stat. 25 (1950), 11 U.S.C. § 96(b)
(1958).
5930 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 64 Stat. 25 (1950), 11 U.S.C.
§96(a) (1) (1958).
CoUNIFOR.
COAMtERClAL CODn § 9-108, comment 1; Robinson, Commercial
Lending Under The Uniform Commercial Code. 73 BANKING L.J. 77, 79
(1956).
01 UNIFORMI
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-108, comment 1. With regard to the
use of state law to determine "antecedent debt" under the Bankruptcy Act,
see Corn Exchange .Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434,
436-37 (1943); Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925); Matter of Ideal
Mercantile Corp., 244 F.2d 828, 831 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 856
(1957).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 37

In spite of the fact that state law will determine whether
or not a transfer has been made for a pre-existing obligation,
there is considerable doubt that section 9-108 will be accepted as a
valid basis for making this determination in a bankruptcy pro-

ceeding. There is certainly a distinction between a state law
which prescribes the time at which a lien has become perfected
and a state law which has been enacted only to contravene the
federal bankruptcy law. If it is felt by the courts that section
9-108 falls into the latter category, it will have no bearing on
the bankruptcy proceedings, since "states may not pass or enforce
laws to interfere with or complement the Bankruptcy Act or to
provide additional or auxiliary regulations." 62
In order to persuade the court that section 9-108 should
not be applied, the trustee in bankruptcy can point to two significant
factors.
First, the Code comments indicate that the section
in question was passed with a view towards the Bankruptcy Act ;63
and second, it is quite clear that the subsequently acquired property
taken by the creditor was not, in fact, taken for "new value." 64
Due to the possibility that section 9-108 may lull the creditor
into a false sense of security, 65 several writers have set forth other
grounds upon which a floating lien creditor may rely in order
to circumvent the preference problem.
Because section 60 aims at preventing the dimunition of the
debtor's assets prior to the filing of the petition, 66 a substitution
of new collateral for old would probably not result in the creation
of a preference, unless the new collateral is of greater value thain
the old. 67 Thus in In re Pusey, Mavnes, Breish Co.,6 the assignee
of accounts receivable who received new accounts within four
months of bankruptcy was found to have received the new
accounts as a substitute for funds which he had released to the
debtor. Therefore, no preference had been created. There is a
62 International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929); see First
Nat'l Bank v. Robinson, 107 F.2d 50, 53-54 (10th Cir. 1939); Dudley v.
Eberly, 201 F. Supp. 728, 731 (D. Ore. 1962). See also Gordon, The
Security interest in Inventory Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercia'
Code and the Preference Problem, 62 COLuMT. L. Rm. 49, 59-60 (1962).
63 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-108, comment 1.
64 Friedman, The Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to After Acquired
Property Clauses Under the Code, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 194, 220 (1959);
Note, The Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Act: Potential Conflicts,
53 Nw. U.L. REv. 411, 415 (1958).
6.5 [1954] 2 LEG. Doc. No. 65, N.Y. LAW REVISION CoMi'N REP. (H)
HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 133, 136.
66 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY §§ 60.01, 60.20 (14th ed. 1961).
67 Coogan & Bok, The Impact of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code on the Corporate Indenture, 69 YALE L.J. 203, 245 (1959); Note,
supra note 64, at 415-16.
68122 F.2d 606 (3d Cir. 1941).
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practical difficulty involved, however, because the substitution of
new accounts for old would require considerable control to be
exercised by the creditor. This, of course, is a situation which
the Code has attempted to eliminate by repealing Benedict v.
Ratn.er. 9
A concept closely analogous to the substitution of new collateral for old, is the conception of inventory as an entity rather
than as specific objects comprising the whole.7 0 By thinking of
inventory as a "floating mass," the parts of which are constantly
changing,71 it is argued that the floating lien covered the "inventory"
from the date that the lien was created. Thus, when new
property is added to the "floating mass" within four months of
bankruptcy, there is no preference-the
lien has been covering
72
the "inventory" at all times.
One author feels, however, that the Code itself precludes
the application of the entity theory to inventory in some situations.73
Section 9-204, comment 4 indicates that a security interest in
after-acquired collateral will only attach when the debtor acquires
his interest in the property. Therefore, when a creditor has an
agreement providing for a lien over inventory to be acquired by
a debtor, but the debtor himself has no existing inventory or
rights in inventory being held by a supplier, it cannot be argued
that the creditor had an interest in the inventory from the time
the agreement was made. Consequently, the creditor would fail
in a bankruptcy proceeding if the debtor subsequently acquired
an interest in the inventory within four months of the filing of
the petition.74
Conflict with the Federal Ta.v Lien
In addition to the trustee in bankruptcy, the secured party
may face another formidable opponent-the federal government.
If the debtor owes back taxes to the government as well as an
§ 9-205.
70
Coogan & Bok, supra note 67, at 245-46.
71
69 See UNIFORM CoMmRCIAL CODE

The concept of inventory as a "floating mass" was developed in Manchester
Nat'l Bank v. Roche, 186 F.2d 827, 831 (1st Cir. 1951).
72
Coogan & Bok, supra note 67, at 245-46.

73 Gordon, The Security Interest in Inventory Under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code and the Preference Problem, 62 COLUm. L. Rxv.
49, 53-56 (1962).
74Ibid. The author also argues that other sections of the Code will
prevent the use of the entity theory. He refers primarily to § 9-109 which
defines inventory in terms of goods actually held by a person for a particular
purpose. Mr. Gordon concludes: "had the draftsmen intended the term

'collateral' to comprehend a debtor's inventory as an entity apart from its

specific components, they surely would have been careful not to define
'inventory' only as a function of particular 'goods . . . held'." Id. at
56.
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obligation to the floating lien creditor, the government will, in
many instances, be found to have a prior lien by virtue of Section
6321 of the Internal Revenue Code. This section provides that
when a person liable to pay a tax neglects or refuses to do so,
"the amount . . . shall be a lien in favor of the United States

upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal,
belonging to such person." 75 Furthermore, the federal tax lien
will attach "to property and rights to property belonging to such
person at any time during the period bf the lien," including
property acquired "after the lien arises." 76 Finally, in order to
perfect its "floating lien," 77 the government need only file in
accordance with the requirements of section 6323 of the Internal
Revenue Code.
To be superior to the tax lien, a floating lien must pass three
tests. It must be prior in time; it must be specific; and it must
be perfected. 78 It is specific when it is definite as to the amount
of the obligation secured, when it clearly identifies the lienor, and
when79 it accurately describes the property that is subject to the
lien.

Perfection of the nonfederal lien, however, is entirely another
matter. The determination as to when a lien has become sufficiently perfected to be given priority over the federal tax lien
is always a federal question. 0
Consequently, a floating lien
that is perfected within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial
Code by the filing of a financing
statement l may not meet the
82
federal perfection requirements.
In United States v. White Bear Brewing Co.,8 3 a mechanic's
lienholder perfected his lien under state law.

In addition, he

began his foreclosure action before any federal tax assessment
had been made. Under these facts, the court of appeals gave

§ 6321.
76Treas. Reg. § 301.6321-1 (1962).
75 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,

326 U.S. 265, 268 (1945)

Glass City Bank v. United States,

("the lien applies to property owned

. . .

at any

time during the life of the lien.").
77Johnson, The Floating Lien And The Federal Tax Lien, 15 Bus. LAW.
906, 910 (1960).
78 United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 84-86 (1954);
see United States v. Davis Mining Enterprises, 187 F. Supp. 911 (W.D.
Wisc. 1960).
79Wolverine Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 165 F. Supp. 335, 344 (N.D. Iowa
1958) ; see United States v. City of New Britain, supra note 78, at 86.
80 United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 183 (1944);
United States v. Davis Mining Enterprises, supra note 78.
81 UNIFORM COMMSERCIAL CODE § 9-302.
82 United States v. City of New Britain,

supra note 78; United States
v. County of Allegheny, supra note 80; United States v. Davis Mining
Enterprises, supra note 78, at 913.
83 227 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1955).
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preference to the mechanic's lienholder. The Supreme Court,
however, granted certiorari and reversed the judgment of the
lower court in a per curiam decision.8 4 The inference which may
be drawn from this reversal is that the final judgment in the
foreclosure action would he required before perfection could
have occurred.
More recently, in R. F. Ball Constr. Co. v. Jacobs8 5 a subcontractor assigned payments he was to receive from a general
contractor to his surety as collateral for a performance bond.
Before federal tax liens were filed against the subcontractor by
the government, the subcontractor defaulted in his agreement with
the general contractor and the surety became liable under its bond.
The only thing that was indefinite at the date of filing by the
government was the actual amount of damages for which the
surety would be held accountable. When a controversy arose
between the government and the surety over the assigned accounts,
the district court held for the surety. In another per curiam
decision, however, the Supreme Court reversed, thereby giving
priority to the tax lien.86
This decision led one district court judge to conclude that,
whether competing liens are created by contract or by statute,
they will be evaluated upon the basis of the "specific" and "perfected" tests.8 7 In referring to contractual liens, he stated that the
nonfederal lien would not be perfected unless the "event against
which the assignee sought protection had . . . occurred when the

federal tax lien arose....
Another indication of what the federal courts may require
with respect to the perfection of nonfederal liens is found in
United States v. Toys Of The World Club, Inc."9 There, a publisher was in possession of inventory which was owned by his
debtor, possession being taken prior to the assessment of withholding taxes. When a dispute arose between the government
and the publisher as to who was entitled to the inventory, the
court found that because the publisher's lien was possessory as
well as "specific," it had been perfected prior to the tax lien.
In another recent case, United States v. Crest Finance Co.,90
the defendant had made advances to a contractor which were to be
secured by the assignment of accounts receivable. Although the
government assessed taxes against the contractor after the execution
84350

U.S. 1010 (1956).

85 140 F. Supp. 60 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd, 239 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1956).
86355

U.S. 587 (1958).

97 Wolverine Ins. Co. v. Phillips, supra note 79, at 350.
88 Ibid.
89288 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1961).
90291 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1961).
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of the assigmnent, the court of appeals, in reliance upon the Ball
case, permitted the government to take possession of a sum of
money then due the contractor. The Supreme Court again granted
certiorari, reversed and remanded in a per curiam decision.9 ' On
this occasion, however, it reversed in favor of the nonfederal lien.
On remand, 92 the Seventh Circuit indicated that, based on the
Supreme Court opinion, it believed that the Ball decision was not
controlling in this case. Apparently the two cases are distinguishable
on the following basis. In Ball, the amount owed by the surety
to the general contractor was not fixed before the government
perfected its lien, while in this case, the amount owed to the
bank was definitely determined before the government had filed.
These recent decisions would appear to add force to the
statement made in the district court opinion of Wolverine Ins. Co.
v. Phillips, referred to earlier. 93 It now seems that a nonfederal
floating lien will only be "perfected" when the event which will
determine the amount to which the creditor is entitled and against
which the creditor sought protection has taken place.
Conclusion
By expressly validating the floating lien, the Code, in effect,
enables a debtor to subject all of his assets to the lien. This policy
has caused considerable criticism of article nine. From the debtor's
standpoint, it is argued that if the floating lien covers inventory
and its proceeds, the value of the collateral may at times exceed
the amount of the obligation. This will lead to the freezing of
his ability to obtain credit when, in actuality, this should not be
the case.94 It is also argued that the floating lien will have an
anti-competitive effect upon the "lending market" because it will
freeze the debtor's 95credit position, thereby making him a less
desirable credit risk.
As far as the creditor is concerned, the security of his position
is certainly open to question in view of the problems created
91 Crest Fin. Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 347 (1961).

92United States v. Crest Fin. Co., 302 F.2d 568 (7th Cir. 1962).
93 165 F. Supp. 335 (N.D. Iowa 1958).
See the text accompanying

footnotes 87 and 88 supra.
94 [1954] 2 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 65, N.Y. LAw
(H), HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-404(1), providing

RmIsiON Comm'N REP.
CODE

140-43.

But see,
of the

for termination

agreement in such situations.
95 [1954] 2 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 65, supra note 94. But see, Summers,
Should Oregon Adopt the Uniform Commercial Code Concept of the "Floating
Lien"?, 41 ORE. L. REv. 182, 187 (1962). In answering the argument that
the floating lien may stifle competition, this author states: "competition does
not occur in a vacuum but on certain terms. The lender who seeks unreasonable security for his loans cannot compete for very long."
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by the Bankruptcy Act and the tax lien. Consequently, it would
appear that the Code's "new value" and "perfection" rules will
have a tendency to unsettle rather than to strengthen his standing.
In this connection it is interesting to note that, rather than relying
on the "new value" rule, banks in Pittsburg operate under a system
of making loans of short duration only. 96
The first-to-file rule of priority has also been criticized.
Any delays caused by searching the records and filing a financing
statement can cause special hardship to the small businessman
who may need credit quickly in order to remove goods from docks,
airports or railroad terminals. Delay at such times will cause considerable storage expense. For this reason a first-to-advance rule
has been proposed. 97
Ironically, the answer to these objections is not found in
the Code. It is found instead in existing New York law under
which a debtor has been free to subject his future assets to a
creditor's lien for the past fifty years. Thus, by facilitating the
creation and perfection of a floating lien, the Code merely recognizes
an existing situation.

96 Robinson,

73

Commercial Lending Under the Uniform Commercial Code,

BANKING L.J. 77, 79 (1956).
97 [1954] 2 N.Y. LEa. Doc. No. 65, supra note 94, at 123.

